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B. HISTORY
On November 20, 1942, the United States became painfully
aware of the need for combat swimmers. On that day, during
the amphibious invasion of the Japanese held island of
Tarawa, tragedy struck. A submerged reef caused the Marine-
laden landing craft to stop far off shore, forcing their
occupants to wade several hundred yards to the beach. To
the heavily laden invaders, submerged depressions and holes
became as lethal as enemy bullets. [Ref. 1]
This experience indicated a need to provide
comprehensive pre-assault hydrographic information,
including the location and, if required, destruction of
natural and/or man-made obstacles. [Ref. 2]
To accomplish this task, Navy Combat Demolition Units
were formed. The first units consisted of personnel
gathered from Navy Construction Battalions and Navy/Marine
Scout and Raider Volunteers. [Ref. 3]
The training was extremely rigorous and demolition work
was emphasized. Methods were developed for demolishing the
type of obstacles expected at Normandy and Omaha beaches.
The Navy Combat Demolition Unit men did not anticipate any
swimming, for the clearance was to be conducted at low tide.
They wore hooded, canvas firefighting suits, with field
shoes and long stockings. A protective mask covered the
bare parts of the face; this protective clothing was in
anticipation of a spray of mustard gas. [Ref. 4]
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The casualties inflicted by the enemy during the
European invasion using this technique were extremely high,
however. A different concept was developed for the Pacific
waters, where personnel swam in during high tide to conduct
underwater reconnaissance and place demolition on any
obstacles. The teams were then redesignated the Underwater
Demolition Teams (UDT). [Ref. 5]
After the war, in 1946, the 34 Underwater Demolition
Teams were combined into 6 large teams for purposes of
demobilization. [Ref. 6]
During the Korean conflict, the skills and techniques of
the UDT were once again required, and in September, 1950,
the UDT took part in the major amphibious landing at Inchon.
During this conflict the UDT mission was expanded, and
in addition to the primary job of beach reconnaissance, UDT
conducted many night demolition raids against enemy bridges,
railway tunnels, and similar targets. UDT also proved
invaluable as human minesweepers in the restricted waters of
the Korean harbors and rivers. UDT men in a line abreast
would swim through a channel attaching time-delay
destructors to the mines as they found them. [Ref. 7]
President Kennedy foresaw a continuing need for Special
Warfare type operations, and on 1 January 1962, commissioned
Seal Teams One and Two. [Ref. 9]
Seal team's are organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla, and
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clandestine operations in maritime areas and riverine
environments; this includes, but is not limited to, the
following: demolitions, intelligence collecting, and
training and advising friendly military and paramilitary
forces in the conduct of Naval Special Warfare. [Ref. 9]
In May 1983, the existing UDT teams were redesignated to
Seal team or Swimmer Delivery Vehicle ( SDV) teams.
Currently there are six Seal teams and two SDV teams.
The SDV teams consist of Seal operators who are further
trained to drive, navigate, and maintain the Swimmer
Delivery Vehicles (SDV). Because the nature of the SDV
mission is somewhat different from that of a Seal team, this
analysis will only include SDV teams when speaking about the
aggregate numbers of the Naval Special Warfare (NSW)
community but will concentrate specifically on the manpower
problems associated with Seal teams.
C. MISSION
Seals are enlisted volunteers who are highly trained,
highly motivated male personnel who are tasked with
maintaining the capability to do the following:
Destroy enemy shipping, harbor facilities, bridges,
railway lines, and other installations in maritime
areas and riverine environments.
Infiltrate and/or exfiltrate agents, guerrillas,
evaders, and escapees.




4. Accomplish limited counter-insurgency* civic action
tasks which are normally incidental to counter
guerrilla operations; possibilities include medical
aid, elementary civil engineering activities, boat
operations and maintenance, and basic education of
the indigenous population.
5. Organize, train, assist, and advise the United
States, Allied, and other friendly military or
paramilitary forces in the conduct of the above
tasks
.
Seals must also maintain the professional skills of the
now extinct UDT teams. These skills include the
reconnaissance and clearances of man-made or natural
obstacles of the areas from the 6 1/2 fathom curve (21 feet
of depth) to the high water mark on a prospective landing
beach. [Ref. 10]
D. TRAINING
Enlisted Seals are recruited from Navy "Boot Camp" and
the "Fleet". To qualify for Seal training entry personnel
must not be older than 30 and have an Arithmetic Reasoning
(AR) plus Word Knowledge (WK) score on the ASVAB of not less
than 110. Physically they must pass a combination swimming,
physical training, and running screening test.
After qualifying for training, enlisted personnel must
complete a gruelling 25 week course. Training includes
physical conditioning, small boat operations, small unit
tactics, open and closed circuit diving, weapons handling,
and demolitions. After the 26 week course is completed
personnel are sent to jump school to learn static line
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parachute techniques. Upon reporting to the team, the
individual is placed in a six month probationary status and
must complete a Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS)
program before receiving a Secondary Navy Enlisted
Classification Code (SNEC). Once he receives this code the
individual indicates what department he prefers, i. e.
Communications, Diving, Ordinance, etc. Once indicated, he
is sent to additional schools to become specialized in that
area. For example, a person preferring to work in the Air
Department is sent to a four month parachute rigger school,
whereas someone preferring Engineering department would
attend two week outboard motor repair school. Figure 1
illustrates the composition of a Seal team.
Upon completion of the desired school, the individual
will then be assigned to a platoon, where he will be the
specialist in maintaining and operating the equipment for
that department. A platoon consists of two officers and 14
enlisted personnel. Figure 2 portrays the personnel
required to compose a Seal platoon. Although the medical
representative, or a hospital corpsman (HM), assigned to the
teams and subsequently the platoons is an enlisted person,
he is different than the other enlisted personnel. He has
received medical training and is designated an HM prior to
entering the basic Seal training. Therefore if he completes
the basic Seal training he will automatically be assigned to
the medical department upon reporting to the team, and he
14
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will subsequently be assigned as the platoon's medical
representative.
E. PROBLEM
Because of the evolutionary nature of receiving
volunteers from the Navy into the UDT and Seal teams, no
Navy rating was ever created for the UDT/Seal personnel.
The result of this is that Seals are evaluated not against
other Seals, but against their counterparts in the Fleet
within the same rating. Consequently, there is no limit to
the number of personnel that may be advanced. This has
created a manning excess of E-8 and E-9 Seal personnel.
Currently Seals are over 200% manned in the E-9 and E-9
categories [Ref. 11]. Because Seals have diverse ratings,
when they prepare for advancement exams they study manuals
in their particular ratings. This detracts from their
professional competence, for they should be studying manuals
that emphasize their professional skills such as diving,
parachuting, and demolition. The problem is exacerbated
when one looks at the equipment that is currently in Seal
team's inventory. For in a Seal team, just as in the rest
of the Armed Forces, equipment is getting much more complex
and sophisticated, and it requires more expertise by
personnel working on it than it ever has in the past. Scuba
rigs that cost $15,000 each and can maintain a constant
partial pressure of oxygen down to 150 feet are now in Seal
17
team's inventory along with Laser Target Identifiers and
Night Vision Goggles. Technology is quickly advancing and
equipment that is not maintained properly will cost the Seal
team's thousands of dollars and, if ruined, may not be
easily replaced. Consequently, any time that detracts from
a Seal's primary mission emphasis— such as studying for
examinations on equipment not associated in the least with
Seal team's mission—deleteriously affects the professional
competence of an individual and subsequently detracts from
the overall achievement of a Seal team's mission.
Therefore, a careful analysis of the possibility of
creating a Seal rating is warranted. The present effort
will address current manpower authorizations under existing
systems and future manpower growth. The advantages and
disadvantages of creating a NSW rating will be compared
using some historical arguments and updating them to make
them relevant to today's situation.
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II . MANPOWER STANDARDS
A. INTRODUCTION
Before analyzing whether or not a Seal rating is
necessary, an analysis of Seal Team's manning requirements
should be conducted. This analysis will determine
qualitative and quantitative manpower requirements for each
team, which would be the cornerstone of manpower
requirements for the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community.
NSW billets for enlisted personnel encompass not only the
eight teams but also other commands such as the NSW Training
Department of the Naval Amphibious Base, Naval Experimental
Diving Unit, the two NSW Group Staffs, overseas Naval
Special Warfare Units, as well as others.
The logical way of determining these manpower
requirements is to use the Naval Manpower Engineering
Program (NAVMEP), which is designed to determine individual
command requirements throughout the Navy. NAVMEP falls
under the auspices of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (0P-
01), who reviews manpower determination recommendations
received from the Naval Manpower Engineering Center (NAVMEC)
located in Norfolk, Va. The NAVMEP has four broad
categories
:
(1) The Shore Manpower Document (SHMD) Program.
(2) The Commercial Activities Program.
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(3) The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) Program.
(4) The Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) Program.
[Ref. 12]
The following analysis will consider the SHMD, SMD, and SQMD




In order to provide a meaningful management tool, the
Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System
(SHORSTAMPS) was developed as a pilot program during the
summer of 1972 through the joint efforts of the Chief of
Naval Operations (OP-01C) and the Navy Manpower and Material
Analysis Centers, Atlantic (NAVMMACLANT ) and Pacific
(NAVMMACPAC). By March 1976, the SHORSTAMPS programs had
been fully endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations as the
only approved approach for the Navy to determine and
document manpower requirements in the shore support
establishment. In addition to approving SHORSTAMPS as a
program, the CNO authorized resources support for the
program advancement and encouraged manpower sponsors to
monitor and police workload and mobilization requirements.
[Ref. 13 ]
Effective 1 July, 1934, SHORSTAMPS was redesignated as
the Shore Manpower Document (SHMD) Program and placed under
NAVMEC's cognizance. NAVMMACPAC and NAVMMACLANT were
20
abolished, with personnel from these commands being
redistributed to one of eight Naval Manpower Engineering
Center Detachments (NAVMECDET) located throughout the
country. [Ref. 14]
C. SHORE MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SHMD) PROGRAM
Essentially, the SHMD Program is an application of
industrial and management engineering principles for
determining manpower requirements for the Navy shore
establishments. The SHMD that is produced forms a basis for
programming military billets and civilian positions which
are reflected in the manpower authorization. [Ref. 15]
Other programs that attempt to correlate manning
requirements with appropriate billets are the Ship Manpower
Document Program and the Squadron Manpower Requirements
Program.
D. SHIP MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SMD) PROGRAM
The SMD Program documents, by individual billet, the
quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements to
support accomplishment of all assigned missions and required
operational capabilities in the designated environment.
These requirements are published as OPNAV instructions and
are referred to as Ship Manpower Documents (SMD's). [Ref.
16]
The methodology is predicated on data obtained through
job task analysis, work study, activity sampling, and other
21
standard industrial engineering techniques. System input
data are also obtained from the Navy Maintenance and
Material Management (3-M) system. The analytical
determination of shipboard enlisted manpower needs is based




Operational manning is the manpower needed to man
essential operating stations during specific
readiness conditions of the ship such as general
quarters or normal operational steaming underway as
well as special evolutions such as flight quarters,
underway replenishment, and 1A (amphibious
operations). The determination of operational
manning needs is based on Required Operational
Capabilities (ROC's) assigned to the specific ship
class by the appropriate OPNAV warfare sponsor.
Detailed ROC's ensure objective determination of
minimum watchstation requirements. Quality of
ratings assigned to watchstations is determined by
application of the M anual of Navy Enlisted Manpower
and Personnel Classifications and Occupational
Standards .
(2) Maintenance manpower is the manpower needed to
perform planned, corrective and facility
maintenance. Requirements are determined through
analysis of required maintenance actions generated
through the Navy Maintenance and Material Management
System. The 3-M system provides minimum skill
levels of personnel, and time requirements for a
given planned maintenance action. Total planned
maintenance manpower requirements are mathematically
determined by summing the requirements for
individual equipments installed in the ship.
Corrective maintenance manpower requirements are
determined through application of ratios of planned
maintenance to corrective maintenance. These
various ratios are empirical in nature and based on
data gathered by the Chief of Naval Material. [Ref.
17]
This program also includes other requirements
specifically related to shipboard units, and addresses other
22
allowances such as participation in quarters and
inspections, required proficiency training, fatigue and
environmental efforts, and other time-consuming factors in
computing total workload in the work week. The developed
SMD then serves as the basis for the manpower authorization
for the observed unit. [Ref. 13]
E. SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SQMD) PROGRAM
The SQMD Program was initiated to provide a methodology
for documenting manpower requirements in aircraft squadrons.
The program provides a defensible technique for the
determination of qualitative and quantitative billet
requirements. These requirements are published as OPNAV
instructions and are referred to as Squadron Manpower
Documents (SQMD's). The SQMD is used as the basis for
billet requirements identified in manpower authorizations
for aircraft squadrons. All aircraft squadrons, including
training and speciality squadrons, are included in the SQMD
Program. SQMD's are published for identically equipped
squadrons as "class documents" e.g., the manpower
requirements for all RH-53D squadrons are identical and are
identified in one SQMD. Unique squadrons have individual
SQMD' s. [Ref. 19]
The primary factors considered in the development of an
SQMD are statements known as the Required Operational
Capabilities (ROC) and the Projected Operational Environment
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(POE). The ROC provides a precise definition of the
squadron's mission statements. The POE is a description of
the specific operating scenario in which the squadron is
expected to operate in a wartime environment. [Ref. 20]
Various types of quantitative data are required to
produce an SQMD. The major emphasis is placed on
determining the planned maintenance and the corrective
maintenance man-hours that will be required for the type and
number of aircraft, sortie length and utilization rate.
Planned maintenance man-hours are extracted from Maintenance
Requirements Cards for the particular type and model
aircraft. Corrective maintenance is computed, based upon
the amount of work that is predicted to be necessary at the
given level of flight activity. Data extracted from the 3-M
data bank at the Maintenance Support Office, Mechanicsburg
,
PA, are analyzed in order to forecast the man-hours of
corrective maintenance that will be required for the
scenario specified in the POE. [Ref. 21]
F. SEAL TEAM SITUATION
Seal team's are shore-based commands located at San
Diego, California, and Little Creek, Virginia. Although the
commands as a whole do not deploy, they train and deploy
platoons to different parts of the world, which is
operationally similar to an aviation squadron.
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Seal team is currently required to 'support itself in its
departments using team operators. It is also required to
support temporary additional duty (TAD) requirements such as
the Navy parachute team, base security, and provide staff
personnel for operational exercises in areas such as Korea,
Alaska, and Florida throughout the year. It also supports
administrative demonstrations for high-ranking military and
civilian dignitaries from foreign countries as well as the
U.S. when they visit the area, and for community sponsored
programs such as the 4th of July demonstration. Seal team
must also train its own personnel in advanced small unit
tactics, demolitions, diving, and other areas unique to Seal
Team operations. Also, there are usually 10 to 20 people
TAD to various schools for additional training outside the
immediate Seal team areas at any given time. Additionally,
any research, development, and technical evaluation (RDT&E)
that involves Navy Special Warfare must be manned by Seal
Team operators to properly evaluate the new equipment.
These TAD requirements are mentioned to emphasize the
unusual additional manning requirements imposed upon Seal
team from external and internal forces, which affects
manning and subsequently the stability of platoons and
departments within the organization. This situation is
unique when compared to a ship, for example. Although a
ship may have internal TAD requirements to maintain
adequately trained personnel, it would not have to give up
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additional shipboard personnel to supplement a staff during
an exercise, because a staff is already designed and manned
to support the ship. Seal team is theoretically supported
by the NSW group staffs, but these staffs are woefully
undermanned for their required functions and consequently
must be supplemented by Seal team personnel throughout the
year for things such as operational exercises. Also, ships
do not have "permanent" TAD assignments; that is, personnel
from the ship assigned for up to two years TAD. Seal team
is required to support the Navy parachute teams with
qualified Seal operators for up to two years, further
detracting from the manpower assigned to each team.
As previously discussed, Seal team operators man the
departments that support the operational platoons. Their
duties include time-consuming activities such as the
maintenance of weapons, diving equipment, and small boats
and motors. Personnel also order ammunition and explosives,
check in and out equipment on a daily basis, and prepare
equipment for platoon's preparing to deploy. Although these
duties are often not that difficult, they are time consuming
and require different training than personnel assigned to
platoons. Proper performance of departmental functions is
directly related to the efficiency of platoon operations.
These duties are mentioned to emphasize that adequate
departmental manning is essential to ensure equipment is
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maintained properly, thus affecting the operational
capabilities of the Seal team platoons.
One of the problems inherent in having Seal operators
manning the departments is that they may be required to
participate in Seal functions such as parachuting in a
demonstration or supplementing staff during exercises.
Also, their primary NEC or Rating may have nothing to do
with the department in which they work. For example, a
Boatswain's Mate (BM) may be working in the communications
department because there is no function in Seal Team for a
BM. This is not to say that the individual assigned will
not eventually perform adequately in the communications
department once he has received training in this field, but
once again emphasizes that departments would support the
platoon more effectively if the departmental personnel were
fully qualified in their respective fields.
The current concern for adequate departmental manning is
a result of the fact that in Seal team, just as in the rest
of the Armed Services, equipment is getting much more
complex and sophisticated, and as a result it requires more
expertise and experience by personnel working on current
systems and equipment than it ever has in the past.
Technology is quickly advancing and equipment that is not
maintained properly may cost thousands of dollars for
additional acquisition and, if damaged, may not be
replaced— which could seriously affect the operational
27
capabilities of platoons. Consequently, proper manning is




Although SHORSTAMPS has been in existence since 1976, no
task analysis has ever been conducted at the Seal teams, so
no SHMD has been developed. Nor should it be under the SHMD
program, for the SHMD developed using shore based criteria
would not properly represent the manning requirements of the
Seal teams.
The information presented on the preceding pages
indicates a modified version of the Squadron Manpower
Requirements Program could be applied to the development of
Seal team's manning requirements.
The Squadron Manpower Requirements Program documents
manpower requirements based upon statements of mission
tasking known as the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC)
and Projected Operational Capabilities ( POE) developed by
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare). The
ROC/POE represents squadron tasking in terms of mission
area, type and quantity of aircraft, flight hour
utilization, flight crew composition, student load, and
other quantified factors. [Ref. 22]
Seal team°s also have ROC/POE based on mission area,
types of equipment used (i.e. open, closed, semi-closed
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scuba), and skill factors involved with each type of
equipment (i.e. how often an individual must dive using each
type of scuba to maintain qualifications).
The SQMD process involves the computation of weekly
workload as driven by tasking provided in the ROC/POE. This
workload is then divided by the productive work hours
available in a week to derive the quantity of billets
required on a work-center basis. Workload is categorized as
preventive maintenance (PM), corrective maintenance (CM),
administrative support (AS), facilities maintenance (FM),
utilities tasks (UT), directed manning (DM), and officer
manning (OM). [Ref. 23]
The SQMD program has determined that the documented PM
and CM workload by itself does not adequately describe the
total effort expended by a work center in performing its
required PM and CM. Allowances known as Production Delay
(PD), Make Ready/Put Away (MR/PA), and Productivity
Allowance (PA) are added to PM and CM in order to account
for otherwise not included factors such as fatigue, non-
availability of aircraft, environmental effects, personal
needs, changing work areas, awaiting technical assistance,
inclement weather and transportation. [Ref 24]
The reason the SQMD is so much more pertinent to Seal
team°s is that an aircraft squadron is basically broken down
into two separate divisions--the flight division and the
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maintenance division. Seal team's are basically the same
way. The platoons use the equipment to perform their
missions in accordance with the ROC/POE, and the departments
are supposed to assist them in preparing the equipment prior
to the missions and maintaining the equipment between
missions. The labor standards addressed in forming the SQMD
can be directly associated with Seal team's required
standards. However, although planned and corrective
maintenance is fairly appropriate for Seal team equipment,
a Seal team does not have any large, extremely complicated
equipment that requires major overhauls such as aircraft.
Consequently, the PM calculation of the SQMD is most
pertinent. Raw PM is calculated for each work center by
using the following formula:
PM = (# aircraft) (PM per week per aircraft) +
(# sorties per week) (PM per sortie) +
(flight hours per week) (PM per flight hour) +
(# aircraft) ( PM per day per aircraft)
(number of days per week) [Ref. 25]
Total PM for each work center is calculated by adding MR/PA
(30%), PA (20%), and PD (variable by environment and work
center) using the following:
Total PM = (raw PM x (1+MR/PA)) x (1 + (PA+PD)) [Ref. 26]
These percentages of variables known as production delay
(PD), make ready/put away (MR/PA), and productivity
30
allowance (PA) are based on empirical data within the
aircraft-squadron community. These percentages would
probably not be relevant to a Seal team, but the variables
are definitely relevant. Using these variables, an analysis
could be done to determine the relevant percentages for a
Seal team. These variables could be determined through
empirical data based on close observation and then adjusted
to fit a Seal team's department manning requirements.
Another factor that must be considered is the desired
training for platoon personnel in each department. Whereas
the flight crews turn the aircraft over to the maintenance
people both in the U. S. and while deployed, Seal platoon
personnel must be able to perform all departmental functions
because the departments do not deploy with the platoons, and
consequently the workload that is computed for PM must
consider the platoon personnel doing a majority of the work.
Also, the raw PM would not have as many factors in it and
consequently would look something like the following:
PM = (equipment (such as scuba)) (PM per hour per use) +
(# training missions per week) (equipment used
per training mission)
This would give a good indication of how much time should be
spent on each piece of equipment.
In addition to direct labor standards associated with
the SQMD, indirect labor standards and directed manning also
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reflected in the SQMD are pertinent to Seal teams. Indirect
labor must be computed to account for administrative
workload, facilities maintenance, watch requirements, and
supervision. Directed manning billets are required in
squadrons but are not derived directly by workload. One
example is career counselor.
H. CONCLUSION
In summary, a Seal team as it is operating today is
inadequate in terms of its departments supporting platoon
personnel. An analysis of job requirements per department
should be conducted and standards should be established
based upon on-site measurement using industrial-engineering
survey techniques. Once these standards are established, it
should be determined what the best mix of Seal team
operators and regular Navy specialists is per department.
Of the existing models, the SQMD seems to be the model that
could best predict the manpower requirements for a Seal
team, specifically addressing the departmental requirements
to best support the platoons. Using this model, empirical
data should now be gathered coupled with on-site surveys to
determine which formulas from the SQMD methodology is best





In the absence of an SHMD developed by the manpower
engineering experts, the NSW community has been using a
Manpower Authorization Form. The SMD, SQMD or SHMD
developed by the manpower experts is designed to serve as
the basis for the Manpower Authorization (MPA) (OPNAV
1000/2) [Ref. 27]. The chief of naval operations ( DCNO
manpower, personnel, and training)) provides the overall
management of rating structures and approves or disapproves
requests for billet changes [Ref. 23]. The individual und
DCNO located at code OP-132 CO is the NSW enlisted community
manager (ECM) and is responsible for managing the NSW's MPA.
Because no SHMD has been developed, and because the
teams historically have been expanded and contracted as the
needs of the Navy have dictated (i.e. expanded during
hostile times such as WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, and
contracted immediately following), no standard MPA has been
established for individual teams. Also, as the teams have
evolved, the mission has changed, exacerbating the problem
of standardization.
Today, however, with the redesignation of the UDT teams
to Seal teams, and the establishment of the 3DV teams, the
time is ripe to standardize team organization. The ECM, in
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conjunction with the NSW groups and the Seal and SDV teams,
has established by paygrade, the organization required to
meet the team's operational commitments and effectively
maintain the departments equipment.
B . GROWTH
To achieve this standardization, each NSW command was
asked to update its MPA by the NSW ECM, and to justify any
changes or additions. The modifications were then collated
by the NSW ECM, who submitted the aggregate increases to CNO
in the Manpower Planned Objectives Memorandum (POM) for 1936
(which covers the fiscal years 1986-1990). The CNO
subsequently approved the requested increases for POM 86.
[Ref. 29]
MPA modification is normally a very lengthy process that
sometimes takes years to approve by CNO. However the NSW
request was accelerated because of a recent policy
memorandum from the Deputy of the Secretary of Defense
directing the services to revitalize special operations
forces as a matter of national urgency. Included in that
directive was a tasking to complete necessary force
structure expansion by the end of the fiscal year 1990.
[Ref. 30] Table 1 portrays the 1984 approved billet
structure and the approved expansion, by pay grade, in
aggregrate numbers of the NSW community. Table 1 also
depicts the approved growth of other Navy enlisted personnel
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(not Seal qualified) to man equipment, such as communication
vans owned and used by the NSW community, and to support the
team and the NSW-group staffs as they expand. [Ref. 31]
TABLE 1
BILLET STRUCTURE AND GROWTH FOR THE NSW COMMUNITY
Item E-9 E-8 E-7 E-6 E-5 E-4 and TOTAL
below
FY 84 Billets 19 30 98 212 307 432 1098
Approved POM 86
Operator Growth 21 35 80 120 132 85 473
Total NSW Operators
by FY 90 40 65 178 332 439 517 1571
Support Growth
(Non-operators) 4 11 34 108 143 207 507
Note ; Numbers indicate the authorized billets per paygrade
C. EFFECTS OF GROWTH
The planned expansion will immediately effect the Naval
Special Warfare Training Department (NSWTD) at the Naval
Amphibious School in Coronado, California. The NSWTD
conducts the basic Seal training where classes convene five
times a year. Table 2 illustrates the number of graduates
and the attrition rates from basic Seal training. [Ref. 32]
As depicted in Table 2, the attrition rate for the last four




NUMBER OF GRADUATES AND ATTRITION RATES FOR
ENLISTED PERSONNEL WHO REPORTED TO NSWTD
FOR BASIC SEAL TRAINING FOR FY81-FY34
Item FY-81 FY-8 2 FY-83 FY-84* TOTAL
Reported to NSWTD 188 225 272 304 989
Graduated From
NSWTD 79 115 123 122 439
Attrition Rate 58% 49% 55% 60% 57%
*FY-84 data only available f©r four classes
In order to fill the approved billets in FY's 86-90
more graduates are required from the NSWTD. Table 3
estimates the number of graduates required to achieve the
approved growth in the NSW community [Ref. 33]
TABLE 3




FY-83 FY- 8 9 FY- 90
183 272 313 303 313
Consequently the first billets to be filled in the
expansion process will be the ones requested by the NSWTD.
The training department will hopefully then be able to
increase class size without deleteriously affecting the
quality of instruction and/or increase the number of classes
convened each year. Of course other resources such as
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barracks, classrooms, consumables, and technical and support
equipment will also be needed, but additional money (which
has already been approved) will alleviate those problems.
The biggest problem is ensuring instructor manpower
requirements are met so that the quality of instruction does
not deteriorate as the number of students increases.
The remaining growth will encompass the existing Seal
and SDV Teams the NSW group staffs, and an additional Seal
team which will begin manning requirements in FY-38.
D. APPROVED SEAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
Table 4 depicts the approved structure by paygrade for
Seal teams for NSW operators and support personnel to be
achieved by FY-90 [Ref. 34].
TABLE 4
APPROVED BILLET STRUCTURE FOR SEAL TEAMS
E-9 E-8 E-7 E-6 E-5 E-4 and TOTAL
below
NSW OPERATORS
4 7 15 22 54 53 160
SUPPORT PERSONNEL
3 8 4 5 20
The Seal teams comprise the majority of NSW operators.
Other commands that also possess a significant number of
Seal Operators are the SDV teams, The Naval Special Warfare
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groups, and the Naval Special Warfare Training Department of
the Naval Amphibious School in Coronado, California. But,
as previously mentioned, this study focuses primarily on the
Seal teams, for the skills developed at Seal team will be
used at the other commands.
The support personnel identified in Table 1 serve the
team in different capacities. They are assigned to
departments either to provide expertise that NSW operators
do not possess, or provide stability in departments and
assist the Seals in preparing and maintaining equipment.
Supply and Administrative Departments are an example of the
former, for Seals don't have the training to effectively run
these departments. A Parachute Rigger (PR) assigned to the
Air Department to maintain records and parachutes, and
assist platoon riggers preparing for operations is an
example of the latter. For although Seals have the training
and expertise to run this department, the stability of the
department, and subsequently the platoons and the team, is
enhanced significantly when assigning a non-Seal to this
department full time.
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IV. ESTABLISHING AN NSW RATING
A. BACKGROUND
The idea of creating a Naval Special Warfare rating is
not new. On 12 August 1974, a Special Warfare workshop was
held at the Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado, California.
Participants included representatives of Pacific and
Atlantic Fleets, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Bureau
of Personnel (now Naval Military Personnel Command), and
Occupational Standarads Department Personnel. After
consideration of the pros and cons of adopting separate
ratings for the Naval Special Warfare community within the
context of the new Naval Enlisted Occupational Standards
(NEOCS) proposal, it was the unanimous decision of the
workshop attendees that a separate rating should not be
created. [Ref. 35]
B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
The workshop addressed the rating proposal by
evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of creating a




1. Personnel would be employed and advance in the same
occupational field, as opposed to the situation now
existing, where personnel are primarily used in
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Special Warfare functions but must advance in the
"parent" rating.
2. A Special Warfare rating would be consistent with





An occupational field devoted exclusively to
Special Warfare would be relatively small in size
and thus would severely restrict advancement
opportunities to senior paygrade levels. Present
senior petty officers would numerically exceed the
probable authorizations thus E-7s, E-6s, etc, would
be frozen and could not advance until vacancies were
created.
2. The field of "Special Warfare" requires a broad
spectrum of enlisted occupational skills now being
supplied by personnel in the various ratings.
Extreme difficulty would be experienced in getting
these skills into a single rating. These essential
skills would have to be identified by Navy Enlisted
Classifications (NEC), which would require a major
expansion in the Special Warfare NECs.
3. The present system (i.e., utilizing personnel of all
ratings) provides a degree of flexibility and
mobility essential to the functioning of the Special
Warfare organization. Trained and skilled personnel
in various ratings are now recruited into the Force
and provide essential training in Special Forces
matters. Various levels of experience can be
recruited. Conversely, if a person becomes
disqualified for any reason, that person can now be
returned to his "parent" rating and can be utilized
therein. With the establishment of an exclusive
rating this flexibility would be lost; "drop-outs"
would have to have relatively long training to be
fully usable in the Navy in another field.
4. Retention and career enhancement would suffer
through a combination of the factors cited above.
[Ref. 36]
C. ADVANCEMENT PROCEDURES
After the 12 August, 1974 meeting creation of a Seal
rating again surfaced in 1975 because of the concern
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regarding advancement for enlisted personnel serving
permanently outside their present rating. In the case of
UDT and Seal enlisted personnel, studies determined that
they were at a competitive disadvantage for advancement.
Therefore advancement procedures were modified somewhat for
E-4, E-5, and E-6 UDT and Seal personnel. Initially they
would be regarded as nonspecial candidates within the
competing group of their rate and rating under the normal
enlisted advancement system. Processing would be complete
for members who were designated selectees at this point.
But, if the UDT or Seal member passed but did not advance
(PNA'd) as a result of the exam score ranking within the USN
competing group, the individual would be reprocessed. If
the member was then included within the following upper
percentages of the competing group on the advancement exam
for his rating he would be designated a selectee:
E-4 E-5 E-6
69% 50% 42%
These special E-4/5/6 processing procedures gave Seal and
UDT personnel two "looks" for possible advancement selection
vice the normal one. [Ref. 37] This advancement procedure
was instituted to rectify any disadvantages that enlisted




The most recent interest in the creation of an NSW
rating came from the Chief of Naval Personnel in September
of 1978. Once again the concern arose regarding the
possibility that the NSW enlisted community is at a
disadvantage when competing within their source ratings for
advancement, so advancement opportunities along with billet
structure and career potential was again reviewed.
[ Ref. 33]
The advancement process and advantages and disadvantages
of establishing a rating were again reviewed. The
conclusion was once again that the NSW community advancement
examinations be monitored for equity and that an NSW rating
not be established. Arguments against creating an NSW
rating again concentrated on advancement stagnation, and
noted that personnel attriting would require retraining into
another skill, and also included an NSW personnel survey
administered by the Navy Occupational Development and
Analysis Center in 1976/77 that indicated that overall NSW
job satisfaction was higher than the Navy's average, that
perception of advancement opportunities was good, and that
inclination toward a military career was higher than the
Navy average. [Ref. 39]
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E. UPDATING AND EVALUATING ARGUMENTS '
Although one can understand the concern that
establishing a rating would result in advancement
stagnation, this concern would be mitigated somewhat by the
recent approved expansion of NSW forces by FY 90. As
illustrated in Table 1 the number of authorized billets for'
E-7/8/9 has almost doubled. Additionally, over 30 ratings
in the Navy have 1500 or fewer personnel authorized, so the
NSW rating would not be unique regarding size within the
Navy [ Ref. 40 ].
Stagnation is a very real concern, however, especially
when analyzing the reenlistment rates of the NSW community,
for reenlistment rates directly effect the advancement
opportunities of enlisted personnel. Table 5 compares
reenlistment rates for FY 32/32/84 for all the Navy and the
NSW community [Ref. 41].
TABLE 5
NSW AND ALNAV REENLISTMENT RATES
for FY 32/83/84
YEAR TERM NSW ALNAV
FY 82 1st Term
2nd Term
3rd Term
FY 83 1st Term
2nd Term
3rd Term













NSW Reenlistment percentages for 1st and 2nd term
enlisted personnel are much higher than the rest of the
Navy. These high percentages will definetly exacerbate the
advancement stagnation situation once the expansion is
complete in FY 90, but they are presently required in order
to achieve the approved manning growth depicted in Table 1.
Also, although the 2nd and 3rd term ALNAV reenlistment rate
is fairly steady, an increasing reenlistment percentage is
apparent for 1st term enlisted personnel. This indicates
that fewer promotions are taking place throughout the Navy.
Table Six compares the percentages of E-4/5/6 advanced in
calender year 1980 and calender year 1983 throughout the
Navy [Ref . 42]
.
TABLE 6
ALNAV ADVANCEMENT RATES FOR E-4/5/6 PERSONNEL
FOR CY80 AND CY8 3
YEAR E^A E-S £^6
CY80 92% 55% 47%
CY83 60% 30% 40%
This downward trend in advancements could deleteriously
effect the NSW community because it needs growth in the
E-4/5/6 rates, not reduction. Because an NSW rating does
not exist the NSW ECM does not have any control over the
advancements of NSW enlisted personnel. If he did he could
increase the percentage of advancements of enlisted
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personnel to meet the NSW community manpower requirements.
With the current system he can only hope that enough
enlisted personnel advance in their parent rating to achieve
the NSW manpower goals. This lack of control over NSW
enlisted advancements limits the ECM's authority and
flexibility while attempting to manage the NSW manpower
needs
.
The argument that the NSW field requires a broad
spectrum of enlisted occupational skills is exactly why an
NSW rating should be created, not why it should not. As
previously mentioned the degree of sophistication of
equipment is constantly increasing and therefore the
technical manuals that NSW personnel use regularly should be
the basis for the books that would be studied in preparation
for advancement examinations. Enlisted personnel's primary
and secondary NEC's would encompass skills developed from
schools and/or on the job training in particular departments
such as the air department, and the individual would become
a specialist in one or two fields while maintaining
proficiency in all facets of NSW operations. This procedure
of specializing in one or two fields while maintaining
overall NSW proficiency is already the procedure used by
Seal teams, and establishing a rating would therefore not
alter current procedure. It would formally endorse the
current procedure. Furthermore, it would establish
incentive for enlisted personnel to thoroughly understand
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all facets of each department, because the examinations
would be developed from procedures and skills required in
each department. The current procedure does not provide
this incentive, for enlisted personnel are never tested for
advancement purposes on information and procedures required
for each department.
The next basic disadvantage of a Seal rating addressed
flexibility and disqualification. Although the utilization
of personnel from various ratings may have at one time
increased the degree of flexibility and mobility in the NSW
organization, this idea is now obsolete due to the degree of
specialization required not only in the NSW community but
throughout the Navy. If an individual attends an "A" school
designed to prepare him for learning the skills associated
with a particular rating such as Electricians Mate (EM),
Quarter Master (QM) or Storekeeper (SK), and he never or
seldom uses these skills once assigned to the NSW community,
it is not only a waste of time for the community, it is only
a waste of time for the individual to learn these skills,
and it is a waste of time and money for the Navy. Very few
enlisted personnel report to the NSWTD for basic Seal
training directly from the recruit training commands (RTC).
Most all come from fleet and shore activities, or directly
from "A" school [Ref. 43]. If an individual is qualified
for an "A" school prior to enlisting, he will naturally
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choose to attend. If he's not guaranteed transfer to the
NSWTD upon completion of "A" school, he will be sent to a
command. Once at the command, a request must be sent to his
detailer via the chain of command to approve his transfer to
Seal training. About 50% of the enlisted personnel that
report to the NSWTD are from fleet or shore commands [Ref.
44]. Because the request to Seal training must be approved
through the individual's chain of command, a fully qualified
individual may not be able to attend Seal training because
the command disapproves the request for reasons inherent to
the command (i.e. manpower shortages). Consequently this
procedure actually reduces the flexibility associated with
ensuring enough people begin Seal training because the
number of graduates from training is directly related to the
number of enlisted personnel commencing training. This
procedure may also deleteriously effect the expansion
requirements approved by CNO, because the number of enlisted
personnel reporting to the NSWTD for training will have to
increase to achieve the NSWTD graduate goals illustrated in
Table 3.
The point regarding the current system's ability to
return a disqualified person to his parent rating, and
therefore circumvent the long time required for retraining,
is weak. If an NSW rating was created more enlisted
personnel would proceed directly from RTC's and forego "A"
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school. This would eliminate the cost to the Navy of
sending individuals to "A" schools to learn skills they may
never use if they become members of the NSW community. If,
however, that individual dropped out of Seal training he
could then proceed to an "A" school and continue his Navy
career. If an individual became a Seal and later became
disqualified he would have to be retrained, but so do
individuals who become disqualified for security or health
reasons in other Navy ratings. Again, the NSW rating would
not be unique within the Navy. A reduction in recruiting
experienced personnel from the fleet would not occur if an
NSW rating was established. Individuals who are already
designated in other ratings could request lateral transfers
to the NSW rating list. This is basically the same
methodology currently used, i.e., putting a request in
through the chain of command.
If the NSW enlisted personnel perceive that creating an
NSW rating would be injurious to their careers, retention
may in fact suffer. Changing the status quo in any
organization usually results in apprehension and feelings of
uneasiness among those effected. A full understanding by
the enlisted personnel of the need to establish a rating
through briefings and positive leadership would have to
accompany any change in the current situation.
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F. RATING SUPPORT
If an NSW rating is to come into existence, there must
be support for it from senior officers within the NSW
community. If there is no support within the NSW community,
then the only way the rating will exist is if senior naval
officers outside the NSW community voice concern about the
lack of a rating and initiate action to rectify the
situation. Currently there is no support from within the
NSW community for a rating nor is there concern outside the
community. [Ref. 46]
This lack of concern outside the NSW community is
probably due to the small amount of personnel involved. For
example, as illustrated in Table 1, NSW was authorized 147
E-7/8/9 billets in FY 84. These billets are spread out over
28 source, or parent, ratings [Ref. 46]. Although the E-
7/8/9 billets are not necessarily distributed evenly within
these ratings, one can see that the average number of NSW
chiefs in a particular authorized source rating is a little
over five. This consequently does not cause tremendous
concern with the flag officers who manage the Navy. It does
cause concern with the ECM's that manage those particular
source ratings, however, because they have no control over
the management of Seals in their rating. For example, if
the ECM for the Quartermaster (QM) rating, an authorized
source rating for NSW enlisted personnel, is authorized 200
E-7/8/9 billets, and five are Seals, he cannot designate
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these five Seals to fill billets in the fleet QM's. He also
cannot request five additional fleet QM's get promoted to
fill the vacancies, because then he would be overmanned in
the QM rating. It is a catch-22 cycle that will be
rectified only when an NSW rating is established.
Another reason flag officers may not push for an NSW
rating is the cost of creating and maintaining a rating. It
takes 3-5 years to establish a rating, and it takes many man
hours to research and develop the occupational standards
manuals and tests that are required to accompany the
establishment of a new rating. [Ref. 47] Consequently the
numbers may not be great enough to warrant concern with top
Navy managers when analyzing and evaluating the costs
associated with creating an NSW rating.
Top Navy officials may begin to voice concern once all
the approved NSW billets are filled in FY 90. As Table 1
indicates the number of E-7/8/9 billets almost doubles, and
this increase in billets may really become conspicous if a
concomitant growth in enlisted billets is not experienced
within the NSW authorized source ratings.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOM M ENDATIONS
The time is right to initiate procedures for developing
a NSW rating. The evolutionary process of Naval Special
Warfare (NSW) has been completed, and the manpower
requirements for the Seal and Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV)
teams have been developed. This development of manpower
requirements is only in the first stage, however. The
standards that have been established are based on the
experience of senior officers within the NSW community. The
next stage is for the experts from the NAVMEP to reinforce
the standards established by NSW officers by establishing
NSW manpower requirments using industrial and engineering
principles. If the creation of an NSW rating was approved
by the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC), it would
probably require that NAVMEP analyze the NSW community's
manpower requirements in the near future by increasing the
priorty of NSW.
If procedures for a NSW rating were initiatd now it
would take 3-5 years before the rating was actually
established. If the NSW reenlistment continues to remain at
its current high percentage, as illustrated in Table 5, and
the number graduates from the NSWTD increases by increasing
class sizes or number of classes per year, the NSW
community's increase in manpower requirements illustrated in
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Table 1 should be met. Consequently the establishment of
the NSW rating would coincide with the NSW community being
fully manned, which would be the perfect time for the senior
NSW officers to take full management control of the NSW
community.
As equipment becomes more sophisticated, more difficult
to repair, and more costly to replace, the need for a rating
will increase. The operational equipment in NSW is
continuing to increase in complexity. Any time an enlisted
man studies information not related to NSW equipment and
procedures, he is wasting his time and the Navy's.
Additionally, the establishment of a rating would motivate
the enlisted man to maintain qualifications in all facets of
NSW operations. The advancement manuals and tests would
reflect the procedures required for each department within
the team. Consequently the more information an individual
had about all facets of NSW operations, the better his
chances of passing the examination and becoming advanced.
Additionally, personnel would be evaluated against one
another within the rating, which would allow the top
performers to advance first. Currently an individual could
be the best performer in the team, but because he is in a
technical rating such as radioman, and never works within
his rating, he scores poorly on the written examinations and
consequently is not advanced. Having a NSW rating would
eliminate this injustice and allow the personnel with the
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best leadership and knowledge of NSW operations to advance
first.
If a rating is to come into existence it will have to
have the wholehearted backing of NSW officers. Positive
leadership with a thorough understanding of the advantages
of creating a rating must accompany the change if it is to
come about.
Stagnation within the rating may never be a problem, and
definitely will not be until the expanded manpower
requirements are met. Even then, stagnation within the
community will result only if the community is not well
managed. Personnel should be evaluated according to their
abilities and when they request reenlistment their records
should be carefully reviewed by commanding officers before a
positive recommendation is given. NSW officers must be
prepared to make difficult decisions which may entail not
recommending a man for reenlistment or promotion, and then
stick by that decision. NSW officers should be prepared to
take full managerial control of the NSW community, and
creating a rating will give them that control.
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APPENDIX A
Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms
AR Arithmetic Reasoning Test
ASVAB Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
ECM Enlisted Community Manager
MPA Manpower Authorization
NAVMMACLANT — Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center,
Atlantic
NAVMMACPAC — Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center,
Pacific
NAVMEC Naval Manpower Engineering Center
NAVMECDET Naval Manpower Engineering Center Detachment
NAVMEP Naval Manpower Engineering Program
NEC Navy Enlisted Classification
NMPC Naval Military Personnel Command
NSW Naval Special Warfare
NSWTD Naval Special Warfare Training Department of
the Naval Amphibious School, Coronado,
California
OP - 01 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower,
Personnel, Training)
OP - 132C10 — Enlisted Community Manager for Naval Special
Warfare
PNEC Primary Navy Enlisted Classification
POE Projected Operational Environment
POM Planned Objectives Memorandum
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PQS Personnel Qualification System
ROC Required Operational Capability
SDV Swimmer Delivery Vehicle
SHMD Shore Manpower Document
SHORSTAMPS Shore Requirments, Standards, and Manpower
Planning System
SMD Ship Manpower Document
SNEC Secondary Navy Enlisted Classification
SQMD Squadron Manpower Document
UDT Underwater Demolition Team
WK Word Knowledge Test
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